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ARTICLE

ORIGINALISM AND LEGITIMACY:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR POWELL
ROBERT J. DELAHUNTY *
Originalism, as Professor Powell has just shown, is an answer to a
question. At its core, originalism is an answer to a question about
legitimacy. As an answer to a question of this constitutional magnitude, it
has two aspects—jurisprudential and political. Professor Powell has rightly
focused us on the jurisprudential side of the legitimacy question. In my
brief remarks, I would like to call attention to the political side as well.
The legitimacy question has a long history in American constitutional
culture. It might be said to date back, in at least some form, to the early
period of the Republic. To simplify, the question may first be posed as: how
can constitutional review by the courts of actions by the political branches
be shown to be consistent with American democracy? Marbury v. Madison
can be read as an early answer to the question in this straightforward form. 1
Marbury’s answer is, very roughly, based on an analogy between the
sovereign “People” and the federal government, and the principal-agent
relationship. The People, as principal, has delegated the work of
discharging its collective business (or much of it) to its agents, the three
branches of the federal government. (This is broadly what it means for
government to be “representative.”) But the costs to a principal of
monitoring the actions of its agents—the problem of agency costs—can be
prohibitive. As a practical matter, the People cannot be unremittingly
“engaged” in political activity—there would be no civil society if it were.
Elections can only be episodic and intermittent; mass mobilization and
activism must, of necessity, be rare. To surmount the problem of agency
costs, therefore, the People, in its Constitution, has designated one of its
agents—the federal courts—to monitor the activities of the other two, so as
to ensure that they exercise only the limited powers that the People has
assigned to them. In discharging that function, the courts do not frustrate
*

1. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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the popular will—or at least the deeper popular will embodied in the
Constitution—but give it continuing effect. Such is the (or an) argument of
Marbury.
The legitimacy question, as Professor Powell has argued, returned to
center stage in the circumstances of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s: cases like
Eisenstadt v. Baird posed the question in sharper and more urgent form. 2
The federal courts, charged with policing the political branches’ observance
of constitutional limits, seemed to many to be transgressing the limits the
Constitution had imposed on them. Marshall’s answer to the problem of
agency costs had given rise to another problem: the difficulty of controlling
the judicial agent. How was this agent to be policed, since it seemed beyond
the power or will of the other branches to do so? (Judicial impeachments
were not an available corrective.) The legitimacy question that originated in
the 1960s had the two aspects—jurisprudential and political—mentioned
above.
First, the doctrinal underpinnings of cases like Eisenstadt seemed
extremely weak. They seemed to be driven entirely by a form, indeed a
rather crude form, of the prevailing legal realism. 3 For decades before the
1960s, legal realism had carried out a work of jurisprudential
deconstruction. It had taught, in substance, that what had passed for legal
reasoning was a sham. Judges did not base their decisions on legal
doctrines, distilled from texts or precedents. Rather, they enacted policy
preferences—preferences that were usually concealed, even from the judges
themselves, by the façade of doctrinal formalism. 4 As realism became more
prevalent, it also became more unapologetic. Rather than purporting to
reason their way to their conclusions from doctrinal premises, the courts
more and more openly rested their decisions on naked policy choices.
Originalism was offered by exponents like Raoul Berger 5 and Robert
Bork 6 as a jurisprudential alternative to legal realism. (It was also offered as
2. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.”); H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 259,
268 (2010)
3. On the background of legal realism, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, 1927–1960 (1986).
4. There are many accounts of “formalism,” but in one formulation, the core of the idea is
that law is autonomous, with its own distinctive principles, reasoning processes, and modes of
establishing facts. See Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to
Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2114–18 (2003). In another
view, the core of formalism is “the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.” Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).
5. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
6. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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an alternative to the legal process teachings that were advocated by Justices
like Felix Frankfurter 7 and legal scholars like Alexander Bickel 8—teachings
that the early originalists considered ineffective in combating realism. 9)
Originalism (like legal process thought) was meant to affirm the critical,
legitimizing distinction between legal reasoning (which courts do) and
policy deliberation (which the elected branches do). 10 Over and above that,
however, originalism (in opposition to legal realism) was intended to
provide the substantive premises from which the reasoning in constitutional
cases should begin. Whatever the defects of originalism, it remains—as
Professor Powell suggests at the end of his lecture 11—a powerful counter or
antidote to realism.
Second, originalism had, and has, a political aspect. It is no accident
that originalism is usually accompanied by belief in judicial “restraint” or

7. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1947).
8. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For a marvelous appreciation of Bickel and the
relationship of his thought to Frankfurter’s, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and
the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521 (1976).
9. For a survey of the work of the “legal process” school and its relationships to both
realism and to originalism, see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 47–66 (2005).
10. Justice Frankfurter expressed this idea in a manner that originalists would certainly find
congenial. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119–20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
What is always basic when the power of Congress to enact legislation is challenged is
the appropriate approach to judicial review of congressional legislation. All power is, in
Madison's phrase, “of an encroaching nature.” Federalist, No. 48 (Earle ed. 1937), at
321. Judicial power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on
guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only
restraint upon it is self-restraint. When the power of Congress to pass a statute is
challenged, the function of this Court is to determine whether legislative action lies
clearly outside the constitutional grant of power to which it has been, or may fairly be,
referred. In making this determination, the Court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government while keeping unto itself—as it must under our
constitutional system—the final determination of its own power to act. No wonder such
a function is deemed “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform.” Holmes, J., in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 107, 72
L.Ed. 206 (separate opinion). This is not a lip-serving platitude.
Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of
power—between questions of authority and questions of prudence—requires the most
alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily
coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not
easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail, to disregard one's own
strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of
this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its
own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is
wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial
oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the
wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do.
Id. at 119–20.
11. Powell, supra note 2, at 280.
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opposition to judicial interventionism or “activism.” As a doctrine with a
political aspect, originalism intends to reinvigorate the democratic political
process. Originalism seeks to remit or restore decision-making to the
electoral and legislative processes across a wide spectrum of cases—
especially in the area of social policy—in which law since the 1960s has
been made by the federal courts. Much of the force and attractiveness of
originalism, as I see it, derives from its tacit belief in the supremacy of
politics over law in American constitutional democracy.
Nonetheless, even if one acknowledges the interest and seriousness of
originalism as a jurisprudential answer to legal realism (as Professor Powell
does 12) or finds it attractive for its potentially restorative effects on
democratic politics (as I do), one might well decide (as Professor Powell
has, 13 and as I am inclined to do) to be, merely, not a non-originalist.
Professor Powell has outlined a compelling jurisprudential case against pure
originalism—a tendency that he, as a “conservative” American
constitutionalist, regards as aberrant, impoverishing, utopian, and
“radical.” 14 I hope Professor Powell will not be in the least offended if I
compare his view of the American Constitution to Jane Jacobs’ view of the
American city. 15 Just as Jacobs argued eloquently on behalf of teeming,
vital, unplanned, and human-friendly urban spaces over the radical,
simplified, and anti-humanist architecture of Le Corbusier, so Professor
Powell embraces the eclectic, rich, complex, and polyphonous tradition of
American constitutional and common law over the stark simplicities of the
originalist project.
But I think that merely not being a non-originalist will fail, in the end,
to be a stable, defensible position. For one thing, the role of constitutional
review in American public life has surely become far more pervasive than it
was at the beginning of the Republic, or indeed at any time up to the 1960s.
The federal courts have absorbed more and more of the responsibilities of
general governance than was ever true in the past. Our courts manage
prisons, set war policy, monitor public school curricula, and determine how
confidential the relations between parents and their pregnant teenage
daughters are to be. Were any of these ever counted among the courts’
traditional functions? I think that Professor Powell’s emphasis on the
continuities of the American constitutional tradition16 tends to discount the
12. Id.
13. Id. at 259.
14. Id. at 272.
15. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). This
enormously influential book is a critique of twentieth century “modernist” urban planning. Jacobs
scathingly attacked reliance on deductive reasoning to find principles on which cities could be
planned. One of her leading targets was the French planner Le Corbusier and his vision of a
“Radiant City.” Id. at 21–24 (describing Le Corbusier’s “Radiant City”).
16. Powell, supra note 2, at 274.
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importance of this vast expansion of the judicial role. Even in the longue
durée, there can be profound change.
Further, the problem is not merely the courts’ assumption of
untraditional roles that draw them deep into the sphere of the political: at a
deeper level, the question is whether the tradition to which legal process
theory appealed even survives. According to Robert Bork—Alexander
Bickel’s close friend and colleague—Bickel himself was inclined to
conclude that it had not:
[Bickel] counted on a judicial tradition of modesty, intellectual
coherence, the morality of process, to make judicial supremacy
possible. Those traits have often been lacking on the Court and
[Bickel] felt they may have been damaged beyond repair by the
Warren Court. We have never had a rigorous theory of judicial
restraint; for a time we had a tradition; now that is almost gone.17
Where does that leave us, if we are neither originalists nor, altogether,
non-originalists? That would be a proper theme for a law review article of a
thousand footnotes. But let me at least indicate where I would go.
In the Carolene Products footnote, Chief Justice Stone planted a seed
whose full growth, I believe, has still to be seen.18 The New Deal Court had
broken decisively (or so the legend has it 19) with the Old Court: a youthful
legal realism had displaced a worn-out legal formalism, and the democratic
energies released by Franklin Roosevelt had swept away the constitutional
structures in which the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” 20 on the Court
had barricaded themselves. But as Stone shrewdly saw, the Court could not
confine itself to rubber-stamping the outcomes of the political process. It
had a vital, in fact indispensable, role to play in American public life. It
could at least help to ensure that the political process worked honestly and
efficiently. It could protect robust speech; it could shelter disenfranchised or
permanently outvoted minorities; it could purify and vitalize democracy in
ways that the political branches could not. (Seen in this light, Brown v.
Board is not a doubtful decision—as it must be for originalists 21—but a
17. ROBERT H. BORK, The Legacy of Alexander M. Bickel, in A TIME TO SPEAK: SELECTED
WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS 684, 690 (2008).
18. The claim that the Carolene Products footnote might still provide new directions for
constitutional jurisprudence was expounded by Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,
98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1985). Ackerman argued, correctly in my view, that the core ideas of
the footnote would need to be rethought to fit contemporary circumstances.
19. For a revisionist perspective, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). For a post-revisionist
view, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST.
REV. 1052 (2005).
20. For further information on the “Four Horsemen,” see THE SUPREME COURT: THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 246–48 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
21. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A

100506 Delahunty Ready for Proofs (Schmall)

286

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

10/2/2011 9:15 PM

[Vol. 7:2

necessary and ineluctable one.) I do not think that either the committed
originalists on today’s Supreme Court, or the committed non-originalists
(possibly excepting Justice Breyer) see the judicial role in this light. But I
think that it may be time to close the debate on originalism, and turn the
constitutional conversation in this direction instead.
I can give here only the briefest sketch of how a Carolene Productsbased theory could change the ways in which constitutional cases are
argued and decided. Let me give two recent examples. This Term’s major
campaign finance case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 22
featured a skirmish between Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia over the
“original understanding” of the First Amendment with regard to corporate
speech. Justice Stevens sought to show that the Framers “took it as a given
that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the
public welfare.” 23 He did, however, hedge his conclusions, saying that “[t]o
the extent that the Framers’ views are discernible and relevant to the
disposition of this case, they would appear to cut strongly against the
majority’s position.” 24 Justice Scalia responded that “modern corporations
might not qualify for exclusion [from First Amendment protection]. Most of
the Founders’ resentment towards corporations was directed at the stategranted monopoly privileges that individually chartered corporations
enjoyed.” 25 While both Justices seemed to think that the discussion of the
Framers’ views of corporations was something of a distraction, they both
devoted a substantial part of their opinions to considering those views—the
effect, no doubt, of originalism. But the question of what the Framers would
make of the speech rights of the modern business corporation—even if one
could give a plausible answer to it—is of little use in deciding a case such
as this. On the Carolene Products approach, however, the central issues
would be framed in a more direct and probing way: Does the Congressional
ban on the use of corporate or union general treasury funds to make certain
“electioneering communications” within set periods before a primary or an
election protect the political process from the distorting effects of corporate
wealth? Or is the statute instead a device for sheltering incumbent officeholders from vigorous electoral competition, or for tilting the field in favor
of the major media corporations as against other corporate entities? The
central focus of the Court’s review would thus be on whether the statute
tends to open up or constrict the political process.
The pending litigation over California’s “Proposition 8” provides

Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The
Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995).
22. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
23. Id. at 949–50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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another example. Did California voters violate the federal Constitution by
adopting a State constitutional amendment recognizing only marriages
between a man and a woman? 26 Viewing the issue through the Carolene
Products prism, the resolution of the case would largely turn on whether the
class of homosexuals constitutes something similar to a “discrete and
insular minority”? More exactly, the question would become whether that
group suffers from some kind of inherent liability in the political process
that marginalizes or isolates it, thus disenabling it from forming part of an
electoral coalition that has a fair chance of winning victories in matters of
concern to that group? 27 (The Supreme Court may have assumed so in its
otherwise opaque decision in the Romer case. 28) In answering that question,
the Court could evaluate such matters as the amount and sources of the
expenditures on both sides of the issue in the California ballot initiative. 29 It
could also consider the views of some public choice theorists that small,
homogeneous groups may be disproportionately powerful in political
campaigns. 30 Once again, the focus of constitutional review would be on
eliminating structural flaws in the democratic process. I leave with the
question: Is this not a better answer to the problem of legitimacy than either
originalism or legal process theory?

26. See Wikipedia.org, California Proposition 8 (2008), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
California_Prop_8 (last visited March 23, 2010).
27. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1015 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority
of this country's population. Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested
against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless
to pursue their rights openly in the political arena.”). For an argument that homosexuality should
be a suspect class, but not because of political powerlessness, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM
DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117–18 (2010).
28. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996).
29. The campaigns for and against Proposition 8 raised $39.9 million and $43.3 million,
respectively. Contributions totaled over $83 million from over 64,000 people in all fifty states and
more than twenty foreign countries, setting a new record nationally for a social policy initiative
and trumping every other race in the country in spending except the presidential contest.
Wikipedia.org, California Proposition 8 (2008), supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 127 (2d ed. 1971).

